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Note
Same-Sex Marriage and Disestablishing
Parentage: Reconceptualizing Legal Parenthood
Through Surrogacy
Michael S. DePrince*
Recently married, Anne and Andrew decide they want to
have their first child. After multiple failed attempts, the couple
learns that Andrew has a low sperm count, rendering him functionally infertile. Desiring a child that is genetically related to
at least one of them, Anne and Andrew pursue alternative biological reproduction in lieu of adoption. They obtain sperm from
an anonymous donor and Anne undergoes artificial insemination, resulting in a viable pregnancy. Shortly before the child‘s
birth, however, the couple files for divorce. At this time, Andrew maintains that he is not the child‘s genetic father and,
consequently, should not be responsible for the child upon the
dissolution of the marriage. To the contrary, Anne indicates
that notwithstanding biology, Andrew is equally the child‘s legal parent. Can Andrew successfully disestablish his
parenthood?
Now, entertain instead an alternative iteration of the
above factual scenario: Anne and Andrew are Bill and Andrew.
Bill and Andrew, a married couple, decide to have a child. Because the couple is structurally infertile, they obtain an egg
from an anonymous donor. The couple uses Bill‘s sperm to create a viable embryo and subsequently implants the embryo into
the womb of a third-party gestational carrier. Shortly before
the child‘s birth, however, the couple files for divorce. Can An* J.D. Candidate 2016, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S./B.A.
2013, West Chester University. Thank you to Professor June Carbone for her
invaluable guidance and for allowing me to challenge my own perspectives
through hours of profound conversation. Thank you to the board and staff of
the Minnesota Law Review for their helpful feedback and for providing a
meaningful outlet to discuss issues impacting the LGBT community. Thank
you to my numerous mentors who have guided me through my academic journey. And most importantly, thank you to my family for years of boundless
love, support, and encouragement, without which nothing would be possible.
Copyright © 2015 by Michael S. DePrince.
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drew, being genetically unrelated to the child, disestablish his
legal fatherhood? Does the answer differ because Bill and Andrew are not Anne and Andrew? What if they were Anne and
Barbara instead?
Parenthood is quite easily determined when a married
couple conceives a child through sexual reproduction. ―The biological mother and father are the child‘s legal parents, and
marriage unites them in an enterprise of lifelong duration.‖1
However, family law has undergone dramatic changes in recent
decades,2 and the deviation from this historic unification of sex,
reproduction, and marriage yields inherent uncertainty underlying the above scenarios. Today, the definition of parentage,
and in turn ―the determination of which adults receive legal
recognition in children‘s lives,‖ represents one of modern family
law‘s most contentious issues: ―Not only are jurisdictions irreconcilably divided in their approach to parentage, decisions under settled law in a given county may not necessarily come out
the same way.‖3
Same-sex couples are uniquely situated in this family law
transformation—not only through the advent of same-sex marriage, but also because they cannot procreate through sexual
intercourse. Unprecedented advances in technology have increased the frequency of conception through assisted reproductive techniques4—and more specifically, surrogacy: when a
woman carries and births a child for its intended parents.5 In
turn, surrogacy has increased the complexity of determining
parenthood, and parentage laws have not kept pace with this
technology.6 Much akin to the fractured same-sex marriage
1. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind? Redefining the Parent-Child Relationship in an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 1011, 1017 (2003) [hereinafter Which Ties Bind?].
2. See infra Part I.A.2. See generally Theresa Glennon, Somebody’s
Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital Presumption of Paternity, 102 W.
VA. L. REV. 547, 548–50 (2000) (discussing the rise in children born to unmarried mothers, the dissolution of marriages with children, and the weakening of
the martial presumption of paternity).
3. June Carbone, The Legal Definition of Parenthood: Uncertainty at the
Core of Family Identity, 65 LA. L. REV. 1295, 1295 (2005).
4. E.g., Anne R. Dana, Note, The State of Surrogacy Laws: Determining
Legal Parentage for Gay Fathers, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL‘Y 353, 353–54
(2011).
5. A surrogate may or may not have a genetic relation to the child she
carried based on the type of surrogacy undertaken: traditional or gestational.
―What sets gestational surrogacy apart from traditional surrogacy is that the
woman who bears the child is not genetically related to the child.‖ Id. at 362.
6. See id.
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landscape prior to Obergefell v. Hodges,7 ―[n]o uniformity exists
among states concerning the legal relationships established
through collaborative reproduction.‖8 This uncertainty stems
from the dissociation of sex and reproduction, which represents
a paradigmatic shift in society‘s understanding of parentage.
Same-sex assisted reproduction erodes the traditional motherfather framework, as well as mother-father duality, by requiring a third individual—not party to the marriage—to play an
integral biological role in conception (albeit oftentimes with no
intent to play a functional role as a parent). With more children
conceived through alternative reproductive means and born into same-sex marriages, determining parentage proves ―increasingly problematic and ripe for growing caseloads.‖9
Moreover, same-sex marriage yields same-sex divorce, a
concept and practice still evolving in the United States.10 Traditional parentage frameworks were largely contested when divorce rates spiked amongst the heterosexual population during
the latter-twentieth century. Previously, husbands would not
have inquired into their paternity at divorce, as no confirmatory means then existed. Because the upsurge in divorce occurred
at the same time as the advent of near-certain paternity testing, however, an unprecedented wave of presumed fathers—
who thought (and held out) a child born during the marriage to
be their own—sought to disestablish their parenthood by proving non-biological paternity at divorce.11 Thus, while advocates
and academics stress the importance of clear legal frameworks

7. The Supreme Court decided the landmark marriage equality decision,
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), during this Note‘s publication.
Nonetheless, jurisdictional discord persists around collaborative reproduction
and legal parentage.
8. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, The Past, Present and Future of the
Marital Presumption, in THE INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY LAW 387,
394 (Bill Atkin & Fareda Banda eds., 2013) [hereinafter The Past, Present and
Future].
9. Dana, supra note 4, at 357.
10. See generally Courtney G. Joslin, Modernizing Divorce Jurisdiction:
Same-Sex Couples and Minimum Contacts, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1669, 1679 (2011)
(outlining the challenge same-sex couples faced in meeting jurisdictionalbased divorce residency requirements); Joseph William Singer, Same Sex
Marriage, Full Faith and Credit, and the Evasion of Obligation, 1 STAN. J.
C.R. & C.L. 1, 13–14 (2005) (identifying the geographic limitations of same-sex
divorce pre-Obergefell).
11. See infra Part I.A.2; see, e.g., Jana Singer, Marriage, Biology, and Paternity: The Case for Revitalizing the Marital Presumption, 65 MD. L. REV. 246,
261 (2006).
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to establish same-sex parentage,12 its discussion within the
context of a same-sex partner‘s attempt to disestablish
parenthood proves equally pressing. As all states begin to recognize same-sex marriages, a subset of these marriages will not
only inevitably result in same-sex divorce, but also the birth of
children that will only be biologically related to, at most, one of
their parents.13
This Note explores the currently indeterminate legal status
of intended same-sex parents who are party to a surrogacy arrangement, with express concern regarding same-sex marriages that dissolve while a child is still in the womb. Same-sex
couples, like infertile heterosexual couples, are different from
fertile heterosexual couples in that they must intend a pregnancy for it to occur. Same-sex couples must therefore arrange
for the conception of a child with the involvement of a thirdparty sperm donor, egg donor, and/or surrogate. This need for
third-party involvement offers the opportunity to establish intended parentage in writing, and same-sex couples can also arrange for the severance of the parental status of third-party
participants. State law ultimately determines the timing of
such severance, with some doing so at the time of conception
and others after a child‘s birth. It is possible, however, that a
same-sex couple could arrange for the severance of the parental
status of other parties, yet be unable to establish the parental
status of the intended same-sex parents—namely, the nonbiological partner—until after birth. In the period between the
severance of the third party‘s parental status and the establishment of the intended parents‘ parental status, the marital
relationship could end. At this time, the non-biological partner
could attempt to disestablish any and all responsibility for the
child, leaving the child with the support of only one of its intended parents at birth.
While the discussion focuses namely on the LGBT14 community, this Note acknowledges that the same uncertainties
and resultant concerns can potentially arise with heterosexual

12. See Dana, supra note 4, at 373.
13. Cf. Tiffany L. Palmer, The Winding Road to the Two-Dad Family: Issues Arising in Interstate Surrogacy for Gay Couples, 8 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB.
POL‘Y 895, 916 (2011) (―There have been few reported cases of custody disputes between gay male partners who have co-parented a child through surrogacy, as compared with cases involving lesbian couples [so] embroiled . . . .‖).
14. LGBT is an initialism referring to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender.
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marriages that dissolve mid-surrogacy arrangement.15 Though
states can deal with this scenario in a variety of ways, almost
all states have used estoppel or intent to lock in an intended
parent who participated in bringing about the conception of a
child.16 Same-sex couples, however, are uniquely situated within this family law quandary given the implicit heterosexism—
the implicit social, legislative, and judicial preference for children having both a mother and a father17—that pervades social
structures in the United States.18 Accordingly, this Note‘s proposed solutions are drafted to enhance legal certainty for samesex couples procreating through surrogacy, but are also designed to uniformly apply to the heterosexual population.
Meaningful examination of this issue first requires an understanding of the basis for modern social perceptions of
parenthood and their deficiencies as broadly applied to samesex couples choosing to procreate through alternative reproductive means. Part I examines the evolution of legal parenthood,
the transformation of the American family unit, and the
frameworks now employed in heterosexual contested parentage
cases. Next, Part II posits that laterally applying current parentage frameworks to procreative same-sex parents unduly allows a non-biological intended parent to disestablish future
parenthood. In response, Part III proposes model surrogacy
statutes, influenced by intent-based and labor-based parentage
theories, which will better define the legal roles and responsibilities—both pre-conception and pre-birth—of intended parents and surrogates alike.

15. E.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998)
(involving the legal parentage determination of a child conceived with donor
egg and donor sperm and carried by a gestational surrogate whose intended
parents‘ heterosexual marriage ended mid-pregnancy).
16. See Interview with June Carbone, Robina Chair in Law, Sci., & Tech.,
Univ. of Minn. Law Sch., in Minneapolis, Minn. (Mar. 6, 2015).
17. Compare In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (―There is nothing
in our culture or society that even begins to suggest a fundamental right on
the part of the father to the custody of the child as part of his right to procreate when opposed by the claim of the [natural] mother to the same child.‖),
with A.G.R. v. D.R.H., No. FD-09-001838-07 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Dec. 23,
2009) (granting parental rights to a same-sex couple‘s gestational carrier who
had no genetic link to the children).
18. For a succinct overview of heterosexism and gender bias, see Dana,
supra note 4, at 373–74.
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I. WHAT IT MEANS TO BE A PARENT: THEN AND NOW
Discussion of disestablishing same-sex parentage is inextricably linked to the foundational underpinnings of establishing traditional parentage, still deeply rooted in American society and law. To further illustrate the uncertainty around
disestablishing same-sex parentage, this Part traces the evolution of family law and parentage. Section A describes the development of the marital presumption and its subsequent weakening alongside the decline of the traditional family unit. Section
B then explains the current jurisdictional split as to the presumption‘s application given new societal perceptions and values around the meaning of ―parentage.‖ Lastly, Section C introduces the evolution of same-sex marriage, reproduction, and
parenthood.
A. DEFINING PARENTHOOD IN THE CONTEMPORARY UNITED
STATES
In the United States today, no express legal construct imposes a lifetime of ostracism and economic hardship on children
born out of wedlock. Even so, modern conceptions of parentage
display vestiges of early common law when such illegitimacy
resulted in severe social stigma. Cognizing contemporary notions of parenthood necessitates understanding not only its
common law roots, but its swift evolution during the lattertwentieth century.
1. The Evolution of the Marital Presumption and the
American Family Unit
Influenced by Ancient Roman law, early English common
law deemed a child born outside of marriage filius nullius: literally, no one‘s son.19 Such a framework yielded dire consequences to bastard children. As the ―son of nobody,‖ bastardy
subjected a child to discrimination ―in all realms of life,‖ and
nullified the right to parental support—in turn severing the
line of succession.20 Hence developed ―one of the most firmly-

19. Glennon, supra note 2, at 553.
20. Id. at 563; see also Mikaela Shotwell, Note, Won’t Somebody Please
Think of the Children?!: Why Iowa Must Extend the Marital Presumption to
Children Born to Married, Same-Sex Couples, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST.
141, 143–44 (2012) (addressing the martial presumption as it applies to samesex couples and their children under Iowa law).
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established and persuasive precepts known in law‖: the marital
presumption of parenthood.21
Under English common law, the marital presumption
served a twofold function. When a child was born into a marriage, the woman, having given birth as a function of biology,
was presumed the child‘s mother; likewise, the woman‘s husband, by virtue of marriage to the mother, was presumed the
child‘s father.22 This effectively framed parenthood biologically,
but during an era wherein genetic certainty lay only with the
mother (as no method existed to confirm a father‘s genetic relation to a child).23 Nonetheless, a child‘s legitimacy filled ―society‘s need for stability and certainty in family relationships.‖24
The marital presumption thus restricted evidence ―that might
disprove a husband‘s [biological] paternity . . . [and] call into
question the child‘s identity and inheritance,‖ thereby limiting
any post-birth inquiry around illegitimacy and rendering the
presumption of parenthood virtually irrebuttable.25
The marital presumption of parentage framework later
crossed the Atlantic and was absorbed into early American
law.26 This absorption effectively imbedded the marital presumption within the United States‘ sociocultural landscape,
bolstering the cultural unification of sex, reproduction, and

21. Rhonda Wasserman, DOMA and the Happy Family: A Lesson in Irony,
41 CAL. W. INT‘L L.J. 275, 280 (2010).
22. Id. at 279.
23. See Glennon, supra note 2, at 555.
24. Id. at 563.
25. Which Ties Bind?, supra note 1, at 1019, 1050. But see id. at 1018
(noting the presumption was not absolute, but administered so as to avoid introducing facts at odds with irrefutability); cf. Glennon, supra note 2, at 562–
63 (―The mother and presumed father could only rebut that presumption by
proving that the husband did not have access to his wife during the crucial period of conception.‖). The presumption went beyond establishing and ensuring
legitimacy, however: the doctrine also implicitly reinforced a sociocultural
stigma attached to nonmarital sexual relations and childrearing. See Which
Ties Bind?, supra note 1, at 1018. In buttressing marriage‘s societal function,
the marital presumption created a system rooted in the number two, ―channel[ing] childrearing into two parent families and keep[ing] it there.‖ The Past,
Present and Future, supra note 8, at 387. Indeed, most states still refuse to
recognize more than two legal parents for a child. See, e.g., Ann E. Kinsey,
Comment, A Modern King Solomon’s Dilemma: Why State Legislatures Should
Give Courts the Discretion To Find that a Child Has More than Two Legal
Parents, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 295, 297–98 (2014).
26. And its vestiges still run deep in American family law. See, e.g., Lehr
v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257 (1983) (―[S]tate laws [still] almost universally
express an appropriate preference for the formal family.‖).
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childrearing.27 Marrying ―until death do us part‖ and establishing a traditional household comprised of a husband, wife, and
children became reinforced as an expected (and perhaps unquestioned) trajectory for the majority of Americans.28 Indeed,
this strong presumption applied in strict form in the United
States through the mid-twentieth century.29
Beginning in the 1960s, however, the United States experienced revolutionary social change. The confluence of secondwave feminism, sexual liberation, and the availability of birth
control yielded an unprecedented transformation of sex, marriage, and parenthood.30 With sex severed from marriage, more
births occurred out of wedlock, unraveling the strong tether between marriage and parenthood.31 And as jurisdictions increasingly recognized no-fault divorce, marriages dissolved at a
staggering rate.32
Thus, the prototypical traditional family unit, albeit expected in theory, proves exceptional in fact.33 Whereas 72% of
American adults were married in 1960, this figure decreased to
52% in 2008.34 Likewise, down from 40% in 1970, only 20% of

27. See Which Ties Bind?, supra note 1, at 1020.
28. See generally Brigid Schulte, Unlike in the 1950s, There Is No “Typical” U.S. Family Today, WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/local/wp/2014/09/04/for-the-first-time-since-the1950s-there-is-no-typical-u-s-family (recognizing the predominance of the traditional breadwinner-homemaker families in the 1950s).
29. See Glennon, supra note 2, at 553–54.
30. See JANE F. GERHARD, DESIRING REVOLUTION: SECOND-WAVE FEMINISM AND THE REWRITING OF AMERICAN SEXUAL THOUGHT, 1920 TO 1982, at
1–50 (2001).
31. Between 1960 and 2008, the share of children born to unmarried
mothers rose eightfold, from 5% to 41%. The Decline of Marriage and Rise of
New Families, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/
2010/11/18/the-decline-of-marriage-and-rise-of-new-families/2.
32. During the same period, the share of American adults currently divorced or separated increased from 5% to 14%. Id.
33. See Deborah H. Wald, The Parentage Puzzle: The Interplay Between
Genetics, Procreative Intent, and Parental Conduct in Determining Legal Parentage, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL‘Y & L. 379, 381 (2007) (noting that the
―model ‗traditional‘ family‖ is neither the norm nor the majority); cf. David D.
Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between Legal, Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 132 (2006)
(describing today‘s American domestic unit as a ―crazy quilt of one-parent
households, blended families, singles, unmarried partnerships, and same-sex
unions‖ (internal quotations omitted)).
34. The Decline of Marriage and Rise of New Families, supra note 31.
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American households today are comprised of married couples
living with their own children.35
2. Rebutting the Once-Irrebuttable Presumption: A Rise in
Contested Parentage at Divorce
Although illegitimacy once resulted in a life of social stigma and economic deprivation, the Supreme Court has recognized the ―unfairness of punishing children for the circumstances of their conception.‖36 Though this benefits children
born out of wedlock, this notion places children born into a dissolved marriage in a precarious position. With the social disadvantages of illegitimacy lessened, the strength of the marital
presumption—designed to insulate society from the harms of
bastardy—also has diminished in turn.37
Given higher rates of divorce, both law and society increasingly view former marital partners as ―independent persons
who owe each other nothing after divorce.‖38 Similarly, based
on the notion that ―a parent owes a duty of support only to his
or her natural or legally adopted child,‖ a number of state
courts hold that ―men who are presumed to be fathers through
marriage may challenge their paternity at the time of divorce.‖39 The net effect of a weaker presumption of parenthood,
staggering divorce rates, and the advent of reliable paternity
testing is a wave of presumed fathers—upon discovering they
are not genetically related to at least one of their children—
seeking to rebut the marital presumption and disestablish their
paternity.40
The success of rebuttal varies with any given court‘s view
of the marital presumption‘s underlying purpose. Challenges to
the marital presumption are complex, resulting in a ―doctrinal
35. JONATHAN VESPA ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA‘S FAMILIES
LIVING ARRANGEMENTS 5 (2013), http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/
p20-570.pdf.
36. Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 243–44
(2006).
37. See Singer, supra note 11, at 255.
38. Glennon, supra note 2, at 560.
39. Id. at 578.
40. See, e.g., NPA v. WBA, 380 S.E.2d 178 (Va. Ct. App. 1989). See generally Tamar Lewin, In Genetic Testing for Paternity, Law Often Lags Behind
Science, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/11/us/in
-genetic-testing-for-paternity-law-often-lags-behind-science.html (―[T]he unseemly thing . . . is forcing a man . . . to assume financial responsibility for
children . . . another man should be supporting.‖).
AND
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chaos‖ of ―dramatically different substantive and procedural
law applied . . . in different states.‖41 For example, some jurisdictions view the presumption as a marital safeguard, and in
the event of divorce, there no longer exists a ―salvageable marriage to preserve.‖42 Such courts permit divorce to end the marital presumption, allowing a father to overcome his presumed
parenthood by confirming non-paternity through genetic testing. In contrast, other courts ―are [not] as openly dismissive of
the marital presumption,‖ instead viewing the presumption as
protecting reasonable expectations.43 In such jurisdictions, equitable doctrines such as estoppel, laches, and the best interests of the child, are applied to prevent blanket disestablishment of parentage, viz. rendering once-legitimate children
illegitimate en masse.44
In short, whereas the marital presumption once proved
nearly ironclad,45 ―the destruction of the system that tied children to two married parents,‖ coupled with sophisticated genetic testing, effectively turned the presumption on its face.46 Consequently, a new understanding of legal parentage has evolved
alongside this starkly changing family landscape.
B. FUNCTION, BIOLOGY, OR MARRIAGE? JURISDICTIONAL
DISCORD OVER REBUTTING THE PRESUMPTION
Marriage is an institution in decline. Compared with earlier eras in which the majority of marriages did not end in divorce and scientific knowledge did not enable near-certain ge41. Glennon, supra note 2, at 566.
42. See Wasserman, supra note 21, at 282–83. See generally T.P.D. v.
A.C.D., 981 P.2d 116 (Alaska 1999); Walter v. Gunter, 788 A.2d 609 (Md.
2002); Williams v. Williams, 843 So. 2d 720 (Miss. 2003) (en banc); Doran v.
Doran, 820 A.2d 1279 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
43. Singer, supra note 11, at 257.
44. See Glennon, supra note 2, at 566; see also Wasserman, supra note 21,
at 283 (discussing courts‘ best interest determinations). See generally
Pedregon v. Pedregon, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 861 (Ct. App. 2003); Ferguson v. Winston, 996 P.2d 841 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000); S.R.D. v. T.L.B., 174 S.W.3d 502 (Ky.
Ct. App. 2005); J.C. v. J.S., 826 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super Ct. 2003). Indeed, the Uniform Parentage Act imposes an equitable bar such that no individual can challenge a presumed father‘s paternity more than two years after the child‘s
birth. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 607 (UNIF. LAW COMM‘N 2002). But cf. Glennon, supra note 2, at 570–71 (―Given the dramatic differences in judicial interpretations . . . this provision is unlikely to create uniformity in . . . challenges
to the paternity of presumed fathers.‖).
45. See Singer, supra note 11, at 248.
46. Which Ties Bind?, supra note 1, at 1021–22 (noting this ―historically
unprecedented issue‖).
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netic testing, marriage today proves a less-secure standard for
measuring parentage.47 The Supreme Court nonetheless upheld
the presumption‘s constitutionality in the 1989 landmark plurality decision Michael H. v. Gerald D.48 The extraordinary
facts involved a child, Victoria, born into the marriage of Carole
D. and Gerald D.49 Unbeknownst to Gerald, who was listed on
the birth certificate, Victoria was the biological daughter of Michael H., the family‘s neighbor.50 Shortly after Victoria‘s birth,
Carole informed Michael of his possible paternity.51 Within five
months, Carole and Gerald separated, and Carole allowed Michael to establish a relationship with his daughter.52 But when
Carole reconciled with Gerald, she severed the relationship between Michael and Victoria, and Michael sought to establish
paternity and visitation rights.53 The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed California‘s ruling: Gerald‘s presumed paternity,
stemming from his marriage to Carole at the time of Victoria‘s
birth, barred conferring any parental rights to Michael, notwithstanding his biological connection to and relationship with
Victoria.54
This outcome is significant in that the Court refused to
hold the marital presumption unconstitutional in order to protect and preserve the ―integrity of the marital union.‖55 But
more importantly, in upholding the constitutionality of the presumption, the Court did not require the marital presumption‘s
use.56 Because Michael H. has not been overturned or successfully challenged, states are granted ―wide latitude in constructing children‘s relationships to their parents.‖57
―All states continue to recognise [sic] least a rebuttable presumption that a child born within marriage is the child of the
husband . . . .‖58 But when parentage is contested, viz. a pre47. Cf. June Carbone, Out of the Channel and into the Swamp: How Family Law Fails in a New Era of Class Division, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859, 881
(2011) [hereinafter Out of the Channel] (discussing the competing objectives of
privileging marriage, biological paternity, and functional parenthood).
48. 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion).
49. Id. at 113.
50. Id. at 113–14.
51. Id. at 114.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 115.
54. Id. at 131.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 129–30.
57. Which Ties Bind?, supra note 1, at 1050.
58. The Past, Present and Future, supra note 8, at 390 (emphasis added).
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sumed parent seeks disestablishment, many states have reshaped parentage laws to advance certain objectives in the
modern family unit.59 In turn, marriage—though a valid
benchmark when presuming legal parentage—does not serve as
the exclusive factor for disestablishing parentage. Disestablishment frameworks instead have evolved disparately amongst
the states,60 yielding a clear jurisdictional split. While some
states continue to back marriage as the determinative consideration, other states look to a presumed parent‘s function or biology in adjudicating such parentage contests.61
1. Assuming Responsibility: The Functional Approach
In the realm of contested parentage, California represents
the paradigmatic example of a state‘s judicial recognition of
functional parenthood. The ―true test of [parent]hood‖ in California is the ―actual caretaking‖ role and an ―investment in the
relationship with the child.‖62 Two primary motivating factors
toward this doctrinal shift include ―the conviction that two parents are better than one, and the functional assumption that
the responsibilities of parenthood are more important than biology or marriage.‖63 Within such a framework, the resolution
of disputed parenthood is neither contingent upon establishing
a genetic connection to the child, nor merely assigned through
marriage to a biological parent.64
This is not to say that biology and marriage are unimportant or inconsequential social roles. Indeed, each is recognized as a foundational underpinning for establishing a parent-

59. See Meyer, supra note 33, at 144 (noting the difficulty of balancing
―respect for tradition‖ with the ―changing realities of the American family‖).
60. See Glennon, supra note 2, at 552 (highlighting this ―extraordinary
lack of consistency‖).
61. See Out of the Channel, supra note 47; see also Melanie B. Jacobs,
Overcoming the Marital Presumption, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 289, 289 (2012) (identifying the competing roles of biology, function, and intent in parentage determinations).
62. Glennon, supra note 2, at 589.
63. June Carbone, From Partners to Parents Revisited: How Will Ideas of
Partnership Influence the Emerging Definition of California Parenthood?, 7
WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 3, 8 (2007); see also id. at 15 (noting a judicial recognition of the emotional and financial stability derivative of the support of two parents).
64. Glennon, supra note 2, at 589; cf. Leslie Joan Harris, The Basis for
Legal Parentage and the Clash Between Custody and Child Support, 42 IND. L.
REV. 611, 612 (2009) (―Functioning as a parent is considered, if at all, only
when the primary issue is custody or access to a child.‖).
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child relationship.65 But when an individual attempts to disestablish parenthood, or two presumed fathers compete for parentage as in Michael H., California courts will not give undue
weight to biology or marriage in its determination. Rather, the
court will holistically weigh ―considerations of policy and logic
in determining the most appropriate parent[s]‖ to continue in a
child‘s life.66
2. Genetic Ties Prevail: The Biological Approach
―As biological certainty increases, and family forms multiply, the genetic link has assumed greater importance.‖67 Texas,
so aligned with this approach, utilizes biological relationships
as a ―dominant basis‖ for settling parentage disputes.68 The
impetus of such a policy decision is, in part, that biological parents constitute the ―readiest source of support‖ when compared
against a functional parent, for whom the legal status with and
obligations to a child are comparatively uncertain (and potentially transitory).69 This approach also signifies a judicial response to Michael H., which prevented the biological parent
from asserting parental rights over the non-biological parent.70
A framework wherein biology prevails, though grounded in
undisputed genetic certainty, produces unique (and inconsistent) results. For example, a parent, while raising a child as
his own since birth, effectively becomes a ―third party to the
child‖ in the event genetic testing establishes that he is not the
biological father—with no biological ties to the child, a subsequent divorce would confer ―the right to simply walk away from
parenting and child support.‖71 Moreover, a contested parentage dispute, such as in Michael H., would permit an unmarried
biological father to establish legal parentage of a child born into
a marriage ―over the objections of the mother‘s husband . . .
even when that means extinguishing a substantial pre-existing
65. See Glennon, supra note 2, at 589. Under such a functional approach,
marriage still serves as a presumption that a spouse has assumed a parental
role, and biology still factors when there is no presumed second parent fulfilling a child‘s need.
66. See Meyer, supra note 33, at 139 (internal quotations omitted); see,
e.g., In re Nicholas H., 46 P.3d 932, 937 (Cal. 2002).
67. Which Ties Bind?, supra note 1, at 1024; see also Harris, supra note 64
(―[B]iological parenthood is usually controlling when the issue is liability for
child support.‖).
68. Glennon, supra note 2, at 588.
69. See Which Ties Bind?, supra note 1, at 1024–25.
70. E.g., In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 198 (Tex. 1994).
71. Glennon, supra note 2, at 588.
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parent-child bond.‖72
3. Marriage as Sacrosanct: The Marital Approach
Lastly, some states such as Utah continue to treat
parenthood and marriage as non-severable. Pursuant to this
framework, contested parentage disputes are resolved not by
holistically weighing who would best fulfill a parental role or
who has established a biological relationship to the child; the
individual married to the mother at the time of birth is favored
regardless of the foregoing considerations.73 The primary goal
underlying this clear preference is to preserve family integrity
by distilling a child‘s best interests to birth within a marriage.74
In other words, ―[t]he legal commitment of marriage to the
child‘s mother would form the basis of the opportunity to parent as well as the responsibility to do so.‖75
A parent‘s ability to disestablish parentage upon establishing non-paternity proves exceedingly difficult when parentchild relationships are formed through a marriage.76 Indeed, in
the event of a paternity dispute similar to Michael H., the goal
of preserving the family unit will trump an unmarried biological father‘s claim to a relationship with a biological child.77 Establishing a judicial commitment to preserving marriage necessarily will ―foreclose[] the possibility of the child having a
relationship with her or his biological and functional father . . .
even if that is not a result that matches the child‘s best interests.‖78
C. THE MODERN FAMILY LANDSCAPE: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND
CO-PARENTAGE
Since the 1960s, the United States has experienced a
breakdown of the traditional family.79 But juxtaposed against
this institutional decline is the rise of same-sex marriage,
which has gained significant support and momentum.80 This
72. Meyer, supra note 33, at 138–39.
73. See Jacobs, supra note 61, at 291.
74. Cf. Which Ties Bind?, supra note 1, at 1016 (―Some legislatures equate
children‘s well-being with the existence of a two-parent family.‖).
75. Glennon, supra note 2, at 589 (emphasis added).
76. See, e.g., Pearson v. Pearson, 2008 UT 24, 182 P.3d 353, 354, 359.
77. See Jacobs, supra note 61, at 291.
78. Id. at 290–91.
79. See supra notes 30–35 and accompanying text.
80. Whereas in 2001, ―Americans opposed same-sex marriage by a 57% to
35% margin,‖ 55% of Americans now ―support same-sex marriage, compared

DEPRINCE_6fmt

2015]

1/3/2016 1:01 PM

RECONCEPTUALIZING PARENTHOOD

811

unparalleled development has further altered traditional notions around the American family and marriage landscapes.
Before the Supreme Court decided Obergefell in June 2015,81
thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia had legalized
same-sex marriage, with increasing numbers of children growing up within such unions.82
When a state sanctions same-sex marriages, ―these new
family units typically are deemed equal to, or the same as,
longstanding opposite sex marriages.‖83 Though a portion of
these children will be adopted, several will be born into a samesex marriage through productive means.84 However, two genetic parents are required to conceive a child—one providing
sperm and the other an ovum. Same-sex couples lack one of
these biological components, meaning they necessarily cannot
conceive their own biological children without third-party contribution of the missing reproductive cell.85 Thus, because
same-sex couples ―simply cannot themselves produce children
through intrafamily [sic] intercourse, as can opposite sex couples,‖ ―equality and sameness are impossible.‖86
In short, centuries of longstanding precepts of parenthood
quickly evolved in response to paradigmatic shifts in family law
during the twentieth century. With the emergence of same-sex
marriage and extraordinary alternative avenues to biological
reproduction, continued application of modern family law doctrine will be inadequate to meet the demands of contemporary
families. As with the breakdown of the traditional family unit,
with 39% who oppose it.‖ Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage, PEW RES. CTR.
(July 29, 2015), http://www.pewforum.org/2015/07/29/graphics-slideshow
-changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage.
81. The Supreme Court decreed nationwide marriage equality during this
Note‘s publication. See supra note 7.
82. Of the approximately 783,100 same-sex households in the United
States, 334,829 are now legally married. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CHARACTERISTICS OF SAME-SEX COUPLE HOUSEHOLDS: 2014 (2014), http://www.census
.gov/hhes/samesex/data/acs.html [hereinafter U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 2014] (select link to ―XLSX‖ document to download and view).
83. Jeffrey A. Parness & Zachary Townsend, Procreative Sex and Same
Sex Parents, 13 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 591, 592 (2012).
84. Within the population of same-sex married couples, 12.1% live with
their own biological children, and about 17.3% of all same-sex couples have
children in their household. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 2014, supra note 82.
85. Albeit beyond this Note‘s scope, the only conceivable exception is a
transgendered individual who preserves her or his ova or sperm before transitioning to the other gender and, subsequent to transition, utilizes assisted reproductive technology to reproduce with a person of the same sex.
86. Parness & Townsend, supra note 83.
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what it means to be a parent will require further social reconceptualization.
II. LATERAL APPLICATION OF EXISTING PARENTAGE
FRAMEWORKS FAIL PROCREATIVE SAME-SEX COUPLES
AND THEIR CHILDREN
The LGBT community has gained remarkable social acceptance in the United States.87 Notwithstanding the momentum reshaping marriage laws across the country, ―the law still
lags behind when it comes to protecting the family relationships these individuals build . . . as the legal system has been
slow to recognize families that do not fit the traditional heterogeneous structure.‖88 New technology creates extra uncertainty
for LGBT family structures, for in lieu of adoption, ―many
LGBT individuals and couples seek to build their families
through [assisted reproductive technology (ART)], so that at
least one partner in the relationship has a genetic relationship
to the resulting child.‖89
Given this dearth of legal certainty and protection, this
Part posits that laterally applying current parentage frameworks to procreative same-sex parents unduly allows a nonbiological intended parent to disestablish parenthood of a child
still in utero. Section A explores why applying the marital presumption to instances of ART, albeit important, proves inade87. Compare Bruce Drake, As More Americans Have Contacts with Gays
and Lesbians, Social Acceptance Rises, PEW RES. CTR. (June 18, 2013), http://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/18/as-more-americans-have-contacts
-with-gays-and-lesbians-social-acceptance-rises (noting that ―68% of those who
know a lot of gays and lesbians‖ say they support same-sex marriage), and
Lydia Saad, U.S. Acceptance of Gay/Lesbian Relations Is the New Normal,
GALLUP (May 14, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/154634/acceptance-gay
-lesbian-relations-new-normal.aspx (noting the increase in the percentage of
American adults who consider gay and lesbian relations morally acceptable
from 38% in 2002 to 56% in 2011), with Lila Shapiro, LGBT Americans Feel
Growing Acceptance, Lingering Discrimination, Survey Finds, HUFFINGTON
POST (June 13, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/13/lgbt
-americans-survey_n_3437253.html (describing a survey wherein 53% of
LGBT adults said there continues to be a lot of discrimination against LGBT
people), and Mackenzie Yang, LGBT Americans Feel More Accepted, but Still
Claim Discrimination, TIME (June 13, 2013), http://newsfeed.time.com/2013/
06/13/lgbt-americans-feel-more-accepted-but-still-claim-discrimination (listing
the various ways in which LGBT adults have faced discrimination).
88. Dana, supra note 4, at 373. This is likely attributable, in part, to implicit heterosexism: a generalized ―institutional discomfort‖ with recognizing
two mothers or two fathers for a child, as well as ―judicial bias‖ reflecting a
partiality toward heterosexual procreation. See id. at 353, 375.
89. Palmer, supra note 13, at 896.
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quate. Section B analyzes how current disestablishment
frameworks fail as applied to procreative methods of same-sex
parents—specifically, surrogacy. Finally, Section C examines
alternative parentage frameworks purported by scholars that
will better support and define the legal status of same-sex parents. This broad examination of the shortcomings of current
contested parentage frameworks as applied to procreative
same-sex couples will enable discussion around reconciling and
resolving the indeterminate legal status of intended same-sex
parents who are party to a surrogacy arrangement.
A. APPLYING THE MARITAL PRESUMPTION IS INADEQUATE FOR
SAME-SEX PARENTS
With the rise of same-sex marriage, several states have begun expanding the marital presumption to children born into
same-sex marriages.90 This proves pivotal in achieving stability
and legitimacy for these family units: ―To the extent that a
generalized preference for two parents joined by a legal relationship explains the presumption,‖ applying the presumption
to same-sex parents helps to realize this goal.91 The biological
realities of same-sex procreation nonetheless frustrate lateral
applicability of the marital presumption to surrogacy agreements.
Amongst heterosexual couples, pregnancy may occur accidentally, and further still, may occur extramaritally. Absent
confirmatory paternity testing, a husband may not even be
aware of his potential non-paternity at the time of conception.
Accordingly, the presumption exists to unify reproduction and
childrearing to sex within the marriage—in turn creating legal
parenthood in the father by presuming a child‘s biological legitimacy.92 Though childbirth once resulted exclusively from heterosexual intercourse, modern technology facilitates reproduction notwithstanding functional and structural infertility.93
90. See The Past, Present and Future, supra note 8, at 397.
91. Appleton, supra note 36, at 245. ―Indeed, gay marriage advocates often invoke protection of the relationship between a child and both of her samesex parents as a reason for allowing same-sex couples to marry.‖ Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have To Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage Laws for
Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. J. C.R. &
C.L. 201, 247 (2009).
92. See Dara E. Purvis, The Origin of Parental Rights: Labor, Intent, and
Fathers, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 645, 662 (2014) (―Historically, the marital presumption codified an assumed biological link.‖); see also supra notes 19–35 and
accompanying text.
93. Functional infertility occurs when an individual cannot reproduce
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Consequently, lesbian and gay couples—though structurally infertile—can utilize various assisted reproductive techniques to
procreate.94
As a result, ―same-sex couples do not conceive children by
accident.‖95 For lesbian couples, ―both women know from the
moment of pregnancy that the partner is not the child‘s biological parent.‖96 Likewise for gay couples, only one of the men can
fertilize the egg to be utilized in surrogacy. When same-sex
couples procreate biologically, this not only circumvents sex
within the marriage, but also necessarily inhibits biological
connection for at least one intended parent from the outset.97
The inherent impossibility of genetic relation to at least one intended parent contravenes the underlying purpose of the marital presumption, rendering its application to same-sex couples
a biological fallacy.98
with her or his partner for medical reasons, such as unviable ova or sperm,
whereas structural infertility ―applies to the situation of individuals who are
single or those who have a partner of the same sex, and therefore require another party‘s biological assistance to reproduce.‖ Dana, supra note 4, at 359.
94. For lesbian same-sex couples, each partner possesses not only ova, but
also a womb. As a result, ―artificial insemination-based arrangements, where
one partner is inseminated with donor sperm and the biological mother and
her partner co-parent the child, are often feasible and inexpensive.‖ Palmer,
supra note 13, at 898. Nonetheless, to ensure a physical connection between
the child and each partner, lesbians may elect in vitro fertilization, removing
ova from one partner (the biological mother), inseminating them with donor
sperm, and implanting them in the other partner (the gestational mother).
See, e.g., K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 675–76 (Cal. 2005). Lesbian couples accordingly need not turn to surrogacy to conceive a child. But in the event neither partner can carry a child to term the couple may seek donor sperm and
contract for a surrogate. In contrast, ―[g]ay male couples face an obvious problem—neither individual has the means to carry a child.‖ Palmer, supra note
13, at 898 (emphasis added). Lacking ova and a womb to carry the child, the
only way to conceive a child is through surrogacy arrangements. See Dana,
supra note 4, at 371–72. Unlike lesbian couples, technology does not currently
permit both gay partners to have a genetic or physical connection to the child.
They must either artificially inseminate a traditional surrogate with one partner‘s sperm, or turn to gestational surrogacy, for which the couple obtains donated ova, creates an embryo with one partner‘s sperm, and implants the fertilized egg into a gestational carrier. Cf. Palmer, supra note 13, at 896–97.
95. Palmer, supra note 13, at 896. However, one of the partners independently can accidentally conceive a child in the event of a heterosexual extramarital affair.
96. Polikoff, supra note 91, at 249.
97. See Dana, supra note 4, at 363.
98. Biological fallacy aside, the marital presumption should nevertheless
apply equally to same-sex couples, insofar as one of the presumption‘s purposes is to ―lock in‖ two parents who can assume responsibility for a child. See
Wasserman, supra note 21, at 289 (―As a normative matter . . . the marital
presumption of parentage should apply to children born during a same-sex
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Notwithstanding this fallacy, several states now expand
the marital presumption to children born into same-sex marriages.99 This represents a positive trend in family law in theory, for the presumption‘s equal application helps to realize stability and legitimacy for these family units. However, such
presumptive parentage, as applied to heterosexual procreative
parents, in fact yields uncertainty as to the status of the nonbiological intended parent. Indeed, lateral application of the
marital presumption to same-sex parenthood displays inadequacies unique to surrogacy arrangements, necessitating further statutory reform to define legal parentage for this arising
reproductive population.100
marriage. Children of lesbian and gay parents benefit from having two legal
parents (especially two legal parents who are obligated to provide financial
support).‖). Indeed, ―even in the face of the ability to determine biological connection to a virtual certainty[,] . . . [w]e do not do genetic testing of every child
born to a married woman to determine if that child is the biological child of
her husband, although it would be easy to do so.‖ Polikoff, supra note 91, at
212. Instead, marriage still holds an esteemed role in parentage determinations. A husband, up to the point of a parentage contest, receives the status of
presumed legal father by virtue of marriage—and marriage alone—to the
birth mother. ―The presumption can be challenged by specified parties on specified grounds, but a husband does not have to prove his fertility and a history
of sexual intercourse with his wife to show the possibility of biological connection . . . [in order to] get the presumption . . . .‖ Id. at 216 (emphasis omitted).
This continued practice intimates that, with regard to legal parentage, marriage retains social weight that has yet to be wholly extinguished by biology.
Consequently, so far as state-sanctioned same-sex marriages are to be viewed
in legal parity to longstanding heterosexual marriages, an intended nonbiological parent should similarly receive presumed legal parentage by virtue
of marriage—and marriage alone—to her or his same-sex partner who will
serve as the intended biological parent. In fact, marriage often serves as an
avenue to parenthood for heterosexual couples conceiving through assisted reproduction. ―For a married woman who gives birth to a child conceived using
an anonymous sperm donor, the law will recognize her husband as the father
of the child.‖ Palmer, supra note 13, at 907. This should theoretically apply to
same-sex parents as well.
99. See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.
100. Before publication, this Note originally highlighted another area of
concern necessitating further statutory reform, cross-jurisdictional recognition. The U.S. Constitution states that ―Full Faith and Credit shall be given in
each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State.‖ U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 1, cl. 1. Because states hold an interest in their
citizens‘ family units, however, states need not recognize an extraterritorial
marriage should it directly conflict with local values and customs reflected in
the state‘s statutes and constitution. See Mark Strasser, Judicial Good Faith
and the Baehr Essentials: On Giving Credit Where It’s Due, 28 RUTGERS L.J.
313, 334–35 (1997). The then-surviving section of the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA) codified this public policy exception as federal law: that no state is
required to recognize same-sex relationships granted by other states in spite of
the full faith and credit clause. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012). Thus, states needed
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When compared with artificial insemination, surrogacy
proves problematic largely due to the visibility of the third party‘s biological role in the reproduction process. When a woman‘s
partner (either woman or man) consents to her impregnation
by a third party‘s sperm, the donor‘s active role ends within seconds, rendering the donor ―essentially invisible.‖101 Because
only the intended parents are present between conception and
birth, the woman‘s partner more easily receives the presumption. In contrast, when a same-sex couple procreates through
surrogacy, third-party anonymity is impossible given a surrogate‘s active nine-month involvement in the reproduction process. A number of states in fact recognize a surrogate mother as
a legal parent absent a post-birth adoption that transfers parentage to another adult.102 As with artificial insemination, the
not ―articulate a sufficiently compelling public policy against recognition of
same-sex marriages, nor . . . assert a significant interest in the marital status
of the couple in order to deny recognition of extraterritorial same-sex marriage.‖ Julie L. B. Johnson, The Meaning of “General Laws”: The Extent of
Congress’s Power Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1611, 1634 (1997).
Because not all states recognized same-sex marriage, this ―lack of a court
judgment . . . render[ed] presumptive parenthood deriving from the status of
the couple vulnerable to challenge in other jurisdictions.‖ Polikoff, supra note
91, at 216. As a result, if a married same-sex couple, comprised of one biological parent and one presumed parent, moved to a state that did not recognize
their marriage, there no longer existed a marriage to which the presumption
of parenthood could attach—effectively revoking any status the non-biological
parent once held toward the child. To ensure continued presumptive parentage of the non-biological partner, a mere presumption, without more, effectively locked same-sex couples to living exclusively in states that will recognize
their marriage. See, e.g., Wasserman, supra note 21, at 303 (―When a heterosexual couple marries, the partners . . . strengthen their legal ties to their
children. It is deeply ironic, then, that when a gay and lesbian couple makes
the same choice—to marry—DOMA threatens, rather than strengthens, any
parent-child relationship that derives from the marriage.‖); cf. Palmer, supra
note 13, at 907 (―[L]egislative restrictions on the recognition of same-sex marriage mean that same-sex couples—even those legally married in a state that
allows same-sex marriage—cannot rely upon marital presumptions to confer
parental rights.‖).
101. Dana, supra note 4, at 381.
102. Pursuant to traditional surrogacy arrangements where the surrogate
is the child‘s genetic mother, almost all states recognize the surrogate as the
legal parent; a minority of states also recognize gestational carriers, notwithstanding no genetic relation, as the legal parent absent a post-birth adoption.
Interview with June Carbone, supra note 16. But see WIS. STAT. §§ 69.14,
891.40 (2009) (codifying both a surrogate‘s legal parenthood and a marital presumption of fatherhood in her husband); Thomas J. Walsh, Viewpoint: Wisconsin’s Undeveloped Surrogacy Law, 85 WIS. LAW. (2012), http://www.wisbar
.org/newspublications/wisconsinlawyer/pages/article.aspx?Volume=85&Issue=
3&ArticleID=2445 (―[A] woman desiring to be a surrogate for a sperm donor
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law theoretically should recognize a non-biological parent who
consents to her or his partner contributing genetic material to a
surrogate based on intent to parent.103 The problem is that
some jurisdictions are opposed to surrogacy in principle, and
more are concerned about surrogate exploitation.104 With only
one of the intended parents and a third party contributing important biological roles, there is greater hesitance to automatically presume parenthood for the non-biological—albeit intended—parent: ―[A] third party is always present to assert a
competing claim of [biological] parentage.‖105
In spite of the above shortcomings, when a same-sex couple
chooses to procreate through ART, presumptive parenthood
should apply to the non-biological intended parent by virtue of
marriage—as it has for centuries. This lateral application will
help to realize society‘s desire to channel children into twoparent families. Nonetheless, presuming parentage will inevitably result in presumption rebuttals at the time of divorce.
Just as the law struggled with a wave of presumed fathers
seeking to disestablish parenthood upon the advent of nearcertain paternity testing, there exists a void for how to manage
non-biological parents seeking to disestablish future
parenthood vesting through surrogacy arrangements.

and using her own egg may have problems legally separating herself from the
child. A parentage action would also need to be filed in a situation in which
the child was fertilized in vitro and the surrogate mother is not biologically
related to the child.‖).
103. Lesbian same-sex couples may need to pursue a surrogacy arrangement for reasons of functional infertility. But the biological reality is that
whereas many lesbian couples can procreate through artificial insemination,
not having a womb requires gay same-sex couples to seek a surrogate. Thus,
while lesbian parents experience difficulties with establishing parentage, the
law disproportionately impacts gay parents, as they cannot exploit presumption loopholes currently available through artificial insemination. See Appleton, supra note 36, at 264–65. Indeed, due to the surrogate‘s visibility, the law
has ―never applied the presumption rule to homosexual male couples.‖ Dana,
supra note 4, at 381.
104. See Interview with June Carbone, supra note 16.
105. Dana, supra note 4, at 378. Indeed, ―if a married man impregnates a
woman who is not his wife, the law contains no presumption that overrides the
biological mother‘s status and presumes the child to be that of the biological
father‘s wife.‖ Appleton, supra note 36, at 261 (quoting In re Opinion of the
Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 577 n.3 (Mass. 2004) (Cordy, J., dissenting)).
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B. THE MARITAL PRESUMPTION, AS APPLIED TO SURROGACY,
CREATES AN UNDUE UNCERTAINTY FOR REBUTTING THE
PRESUMPTION WHILE A CHILD IS IN UTERO
With the rise of surrogacy, the judicial system experienced
an unforeseen onslaught of contested parentage cases, wherein
surrogates sought to trump the parental rights of the child‘s intended parents in an effort to establish their own.106 ―[I]t is a
sad, but real, possibility that future challenges to the validity
of . . . parental rights to a child conceived through surrogacy
will not be brought by the surrogates, but instead, by one
member of a couple during a separation.‖107 It is likewise a sad,
but real, possibility that these challenges will occur while the
child is still in utero.108 Whereas the marital presumption
should—in theory—apply equally, the presumption of
parenthood ―does not adequately address the new legal issues
created by surrogacy,‖109 for there exists a ―lack of statutory
clarity on when . . . and on what basis the parentage presumption can be rebutted.‖110
When a woman conceives through heterosexual procreative
sexual intercourse, the woman who carries the child, by virtue
of biology, has undisputed genetic relation to her child. Lest
there be a void between the birth and the assumption of parental status, the mother becomes her child‘s legal parent. And by
way of the marital presumption, biological legitimacy, namely
genetic relation to the husband, is presumed.111 Because presumed fathers sought to rebut the presumption well before society comprehended the dawn of same-sex marriage and assisted reproduction, disestablishment frameworks initially

106. Most contested cases involve individuals entering private surrogacy
agreements (especially with relatives and friends), rather than through clinics.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); In re Baby M, 537 A.2d
1227 (N.J. 1988); A.G.R. v. D.R.H., No. FD-09-001838-07 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. Dec. 23, 2009).
107. Palmer, supra note 13.
108. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App.
1998). Here, a heterosexual couple contracted for a surrogate, but divorced
while the child was still in utero. Though the intended mother indicated that
there were children from the marriage, the intended father maintained that
he would not be held legally liable for child support on two grounds: (1) that
the child was not genetically his; and (2) that the child in utero was being gestated by a third party.
109. Dana, supra note 4, at 381.
110. Polikoff, supra note 91, at 225 (emphasis added).
111. See supra notes 22–29 and accompanying text.
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developed in the realm of traditional procreative sex.112 Under
these frameworks, the child‘s mother served as the only biological constant, and a contested parentage dispute arose with
courts evaluating claims by one presumed father—and possibly
one biological father.
Procreation through surrogacy frustrates this traditional
framework for rebutting the marital presumption.113 With procreative sex, a presumed parent seeks to disestablish
parenthood based upon discovered non-paternity.114 Contrarily,
a presumed non-biological parent knows from the outset that
she or he will intend to parent and be responsible for a child
bearing no genetic relation to her or him: biology constitutes a
known variable from the moment of conception pursuant to a
surrogacy arrangement.115 ―If such a presumption could be rebutted by anyone at any time on the basis of lack of biological
connection between the [parent] and the child, then the presumption would be meaningless for a [same-sex] couple.‖116 In
other words, a non-biological parent would always be able to
disestablish parentage, severing any liability for future support.117 However, when states extend the marital presumption
to same-sex parents, frameworks tend not to delineate clearly
when biology will trump a presumption vesting in the context
of surrogacy.118
Furthermore, surrogacy frustrates rebutting the presumption by pushing centuries-old conceptions of biology and motherhood to new limits. A surrogate requires societal reconceptualization of a woman who carries and births a child as not the
112. See supra notes 38–44 and accompanying text.
113. Cf. Appleton, supra note 36, at 261 (noting that ―[a]pplying these concepts to same-sex couples results in some troubling anomalies‖) (quoting In re
Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 577 n.3 (Mass. 2004)
(Cordy, J., dissenting)).
114. With the ease and accessibility of genetic testing, ―courts and legislatures have moved to allow men to discard their status as fathers‖ when they
―feel victimized by an obligation to support a child born of their wives‘ infidelity‖ upon discovering their genetic non-paternity. Meyer, supra note 33, at 138.
115. This does not apply to gay men who deliberately mix their sperm prior
to insemination. For purposes of discussion, however, this Note presumes the
couple has identified which individual will contribute sperm.
116. Polikoff, supra note 91, at 248.
117. Cf. Meyer, supra note 33, at 137–38 (noting that given the ―ease with
which genetic parentage can now be determined,‖ genetics are experiencing a
―resurgence in the law governing ‗disestablishment‘ of paternity‖).
118. Cf. Polikoff, supra note 91, at 255 (arguing that states ―need to revisit
their parentage statutes and make an explicit decision about when biology will
be permitted to trump the child‘s intact family unit‖).
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mother of that child.119 Because the surrogate bears the child
on behalf of the intended parents, she enters into a contract
specifying that she will not assume the role of mother after the
child‘s birth.120 In the context of lesbian surrogacy arrangements, this instead requires ―having another woman take on
that role.‖121 For gay couples, this arrangement ―challenge[s]
societal norms even further by creating a family where no one
is the [legal] mother of the child.‖122 Thus, when a nonbiological intended parent seeks to rebut the presumption and
disestablish parenthood, the formula changes. There are instead three parties, comprised of either: two intended mothers—one biological and one non-biological—and a birth mother;
or, two intended fathers—one biological and one nonbiological—and a birth mother.
Whereas frameworks to rebut the presumption and disestablish parenthood evolved in the context of heterosexual procreation, same-sex marriage and procreation through surrogacy
inherently challenges the underlying traditional and societal
conceptions of biology and motherhood. Should a non-biological
intended parent seek to disestablish parenthood before a child
is born to a surrogate, the parties must rely on a court‘s determination—employing current presumption and disestablishment frameworks—absent a state statute addressing surrogacy. Most states, however, remain ―simply silent on parentage
determinations in situations involving surrogacy arrangements.‖123 As a result, there is an ―unacceptable level of uncertainty‖124 around how such challenges will be resolved, necessitating reconceptualization of how to define legal parentage
stemming from surrogacy.

119. See Palmer, supra note 13, at 899.
120. See id. at 902.
121. Id. at 899–900 (emphasis added) (noting further that society prefers
this outcome to gay male surrogacy arrangements, for at least ―someone is the
mother of the child‖).
122. Id.; see also Dana, supra note 4, at 363, 377 (―If the intended parents
are homosexual, this only compounds the difficulty of determining parentage
because having two fathers conflicts with traditional notions of family formation . . . . Without another woman to step in to be the child‘s mother, a surrogate will not be viewed as a ‗surrogate uterus; she [will be] the mother.‘‖).
123. Dana, supra note 4, at 369.
124. Polikoff, supra note 91, at 225–26.
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C. SCHOLARS AND COURTS ALIKE ADVOCATE FOR REFRAMING
MODERN PARENTAGE DOCTRINE
Traditional conceptions of family law as they have existed
for centuries do not translate into a society experiencing samesex marriage and parenthood through surrogacy. Family law
scholars argue that with most courts making parentage decisions based on marriage and biology, the continued use of the
marital presumption for same-sex parents—especially in contested surrogacy agreements—will fail to realize and protect
children‘s best interests.125 As explained by June Carbone and
Naomi Cahn:
With the changing conceptions of the family, we must face the issue of
how society ensures children‘s well-being, and whether we should
continue to police family structure or become more willing to focus attention on children‘s individual needs . . . .
....
. . . The issue for children therefore is to determine what set of relationships between the adults is most likely to promote children‘s
well-being and how to encourage those relationships in a modern society.126

Indeed, the law ―cannot protect all children from abandonment and conflict created by their parents, biological or social.‖127 But given ―current legal chaos and uncertainty‖128 surrounding
parentage
determinations
through
existing
frameworks, children conceived by same-sex parents through
surrogacy arrangements are placed in unduly precarious circumstances from the moment of conception.129 Before the
child‘s birth, both the accountability between the biological intended parent and the non-biological intended parent, and the
legal status of the non-biological parent toward her or his future child, are equivocally defined.
Absent any clear social consensus on the indispensable determinants of parenthood,130 legislation and jurisprudence
125. See Which Ties Bind?, supra note 1, at 1011, 1039.
126. Id.
127. Glennon, supra note 2, at 587.
128. Id.
129. See Jacobs, supra note 61, at 294 (noting how the status quo often unreasonably places ―the sanctity of the marital presumption before the best interests of the child‖).
130. Instead of explaining why one is—or is not—positioned to fill a parental role, parentage determinations today rely on ―unspoken assumptions regarding how parental status is generated . . . ‗implicitly appeal[ing] to some
preanalytic concept of parenthood.‘‖ Purvis, supra note 92, at 651 (quoting Dara E. Purvis, Intended Parents and the Problem of Perspective, 24 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 210, 360 (2012)).
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must advance new benchmarks for what constitutes a legal
parent who will be responsible for a child‘s well-being.131
1. Moving Toward Intent-Based Parentage Determinations
When sex, marriage, and reproduction are effectively dissociated—and when parents can reproduce outside traditional
procreative intercourse—neither marriage nor biological relation to a child are guaranteed variables upon a child‘s birth.
For enhanced certainty behind parentage determinations in a
rapidly evolving family law era, scholars assert that legal parentage should be based not on a presumption or biology, but on
the more meaningful measure of one‘s established parenting intention.132
Such a benchmark aids same-sex intended parents who
elect to procreate through surrogacy.133 The marital presumption and current disestablishment frameworks both center on
marriage and biology. In contrast, intent-based evaluations
make parentage independent from ―a state‘s view of same-sex
relationships‖134 and ―place[] diminished importance on genetic
or biological connection.‖135 Should a non-biological intended
parent seek to avoid legal obligation toward a future child, intent-based parentage circumvents judicial determinations of
presuming and rebutting parenthood under traditional frameworks. Instead, the two parties who intend to parent the child
at its birth are more readily identified as the future child‘s legal parents, regardless of their marital relation to each other or
their genetic relation to the child.136
This also helps to realize the best interests of the child con131. See Meyer, supra note 33, at 136; see also Purvis, supra note 92, at
645 (―[W]hy does a biological relationship generate parental rights?‖). But see
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 271 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (rejecting
the notion that biological connection between parent and child is ―unimportant
in determining the nature of liberty interests‖).
132. See Jacobs, supra note 61, at 291; see also Which Ties Bind?, supra
note 1, at 1047 (questioning to what extent a child‘s relationship with a parent
depends on a parent‘s relationship to her or his other parent).
133. ―A pure intent test is the only available method for courts to determine parentage without gender, marital, or sexual orientation biases affecting
the outcome.‖ Dana, supra note 4, at 358. Conversely, accidental pregnancies
frustrate intent-based standards, as there may be no intent to become a parent. This Note presumes surrogacy arrangements do not yield accidental
pregnancies.
134. Lynda Wray Black, The Birth of a Parent: Defining Parentage for
Lenders of Genetic Material, 92 NEB. L. REV. 799, 837 (2014).
135. Meyer, supra note 33, at 136.
136. See Black, supra note 134.
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ceived through surrogacy, even while in utero.137 An intentbased inquiry reinforces parental status prior to birth based on
―significant actions being undertaken by either party‖: in the
context of a surrogacy arrangement, the deliberate fertilization
of an egg to create a life.138 In the event that a non-biological
intended parent does not want to hold the child out as her or
his own prior to its birth, an intent-based inquiry will identify
the parent as a presumed legal parent to be held financially responsible,139 notwithstanding a divorce from the biological intended parent, or want of biological relation.140
2. Establishing Parentage Through Theories of Labor
Similarly related to an intent-based theory of parenthood,
other reform proponents view parentage not as a ―product of biology or a natural inheritance,‖ but instead ―understood as the
product of a Lockean labor interest.‖141 This underlying consideration confers parentage status through ―investing labor and
money into a resource . . . thus generating a claim to that resource.‖142
Such a theory proves especially applicable to surrogacy arrangements. Procreation through the use of a surrogate is timeconsuming and requires a ―significant financial and emotional
investment.‖143 But for the labor and investment of the intend137. An intent-based determination also helps to protect gestational surrogates. A gestational mother—entering into an arrangement anticipating not to
be responsible for the child upon its birth—should not be held responsible
should the intended parents seek to renege on their responsibilities toward the
child.
138. Dana, supra note 4, at 383.
139. ―Once the status of legal parent is recognized, it is a profoundly powerful position.‖ Purvis, supra note 92, at 649; see Dana, supra note 4, at 383 (justifying this outcome through the ―states‘ interest in having all children be financially supported‖).
140. This is not to suggest, however, that presumed parental status becomes ironclad in such instances. For example, a contract or consent form can
serve as a clear indication of intent, rebuttable upon a showing of fraud, duress, misrepresentation, or incapacity.
141. Purvis, supra note 92, at 654. See generally E. Gary Spitko, The Constitutional Function of Biological Paternity: Evidence of the Biological Mother’s
Consent to the Biological Father’s Co-Parenting of Her Child, 48 ARIZ. L. REV.
97 (2006) (arguing a father‘s biological connection to a child is constitutionally
significant because it provides evidence that the biological mother consented
to the father‘s relationship with the child).
142. Purvis, supra note 92, at 655.
143. Dana, supra note 4, at 382. Between legal fees, medical procedure expenses, and surrogate compensation, the process can easily cost $100,000. See
id. at 363.

DEPRINCE_6fmt

824

1/3/2016 1:01 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[100:797

ed parents, the child would not exist.144 One can tangibly
measure pre-birth labor through preparations undertaken
when expecting a future child. This can include signing a surrogacy contract, attending fertilization appointments, requesting future work accommodations, enrolling in parenting classes, readying a nursery, et cetera.145 Labor-based parentage
determinations thus serve a concrete standard that ―operationalizes [the objectives of] intent as a parentage rule.‖146
Because labor-based understandings can be employed ―regardless of the sexual orientation of the parents . . . [whether]
married or not,‖147 a labor benchmark, as applied to same-sex
procreative parents, yields similar outcomes to intent-based
considerations.148 In effect, a gestational carrier serves as the
initial legal parent, the biological intended parent becomes the
second legal parent, and the non-biological intended parent becomes a parent with the transfer of rights from the surrogate
after birth. An equitable estoppel, based on the non-biological
parent‘s labor in engineering the birth, would estop the nonbiological parent from denying parentage at the point where
the surrogate disclaims maternity, notwithstanding an attempt
of pre-birth disestablishment or divorce.
3. Judicial Calls for Legislative Action
Same-sex couples today can ―proudly form families that
would have been both legally and socially unthinkable in an
earlier era.‖149 In response to such modern family law developments, intent-based and labor-based parentage theories represent important stepping stones for the reconceptualization of
what it now means to be a parent. However, because legal parentage is a matter of law by definition,150 such theories alone do
not suffice to resolve unprecedented parentage issues surrounding surrogacy.
Under current legal frameworks, procreative same-sex
couples ―have little, if any, opportunity to establish legal parentage early on for both parents.‖151 Absent such early legal
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

See id. at 382–83.
See Purvis, supra note 92, at 681.
Id. at 680.
Id. at 687.
See supra notes 133–39 and accompanying text.
Polikoff, supra note 91, at 212.
Id. at 207.
Parness & Townsend, supra note 83, at 614.
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sanction, many families headed by same-sex parents will thrive
nevertheless. In the event of a parentage dispute, however,
parties will need to rely on court determinations, as the majority of states fail to statutorily define legal parentage through
surrogacy.152 But even though surrogacy and same-sex parentage do not fit existing doctrine, courts nonetheless hesitate to
redefine legal parentage absent legislative action.153 The present system instead observes judges ―clutching at overly rigid
approaches to determining parentage . . . that do not allow for
the full range of human procreative and parental conduct.‖154
Thus, a new basis to define legal parentage when same-sex
couples procreate through surrogacy is necessary.155 This requires not only social reconceptualization,156 but also legislative
action toward statutory clarification.157
III. PROPOSALS FOR ALTERNATIVE STATUTORY
SCHEMA
Family law is at a new crossroads. Traditional conceptions
of marriage, reproduction, and parenthood were challenged
with rapid social and technological revolution in the lattertwentieth century—resulting in jurisprudence struggling with
how to disestablish paternity in light of a weakening marital
presumption.158 Today‘s twenty-first-century crossroad stems
from a modern era wherein individuals of the same sex can
marry, divorce, and reproduce biologically. Understandings of
parentage must be reconceptualized once more so as to be reconciled with marriage equality and assisted reproductive technology. Surrogacy can serve as a keystone to pioneer family law
152. See Dana, supra note 4, at 369.
153. See In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 736 (Tenn. 2005) (―We, as interpreters of the law, not makers of the law, are powerless . . . to reach a different
resolution.‖); see also In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 293
(Ct. App. 1998) (―[W]e must call on the Legislature to sort out the parental
rights and responsibilities of those involved in artificial reproduction.‖).
154. Wald, supra note 33, at 410.
155. See Polikoff, supra note 91, at 235 (noting the ―dramatic increase in
the use of ART‖ necessitates clarifying ―the parentage of all of the children
born as a result of modern science‖ (quoting UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 703, cmt.
(UNIF. LAW COMM‘N 2002))).
156. See supra notes 132–46 and accompanying text.
157. See In re Adoption of Matthew B., 284 Cal. Rptr. 18, 37 (Ct. App. 1991)
(urging the legislature to act expeditiously); Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760,
767 n.3 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1994) (asking the legislature to act and end the uncertainties of surrogacy).
158. See supra notes 30–46 and accompanying text.
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away from its seventeenth century common law vestiges, and
into a technological era wherein the prototypical traditional
family unit, although expected in theory, indeed proves exceptional in fact.159
Under the status quo, rigid application of existing frameworks means that same-sex parents who dissolve their relationship consequently will ―often leave their children without
legal ties‖ to both intended parents.160 In response, this Part
proposes two model statutory frameworks that will better define the legal roles and responsibilities—both pre-conception
and pre-birth—of intended parents and surrogates alike. Section A explores the necessary considerations underlying statutory reform. Section B next recommends two model statutes
upon which states can frame surrogacy laws: one that transfers
parental rights to intended parents pre-conception; and an alternative that, based on pre-birth intent and labor, transfers
rights to intended parents post-birth. Lastly, Section C weighs
the benefits and critiques of each.
A. CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING STATUTORY REFORM
Prevailing theories of parentage often fail to identify the
origins of parenthood, instead hinging the right to parent on
marital status or biology.161 For same-sex parents procreating
by way of surrogacy, parenthood should not and cannot vest
through these benchmarks.162 Surrogacy entails calculated and
concerted efforts to conceive a child—a child that may not share
genetic relation to one of her or his future intended parents.
And in the context of same-sex intended parents, this further
breaks from archetypal mother-father duality. Thus, surrogacy
obliges reexamining issues of marriage, biology, and parental
intentionality.163

159. ―In an era of readily available divorce and DNA testing, we need to
reexamine the policies likely to promote permanent ties . . . .‖ Which Ties
Bind?, supra note 1, at 1012.
160. Parness & Townsend, supra note 83, at 614.
161. Cf. Purvis, supra note 92, at 645 (―[T]he law has shifted over time,
from favoring a property right based in genetics to a Lockean theory of property rights earned through labor.‖).
162. See supra Part II.A–.B.
163. Cf. Wald, supra note 33, at 383 (explaining further that surrogacy
―calls into question the value we place on genetics in assigning parental
rights‖).
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1. What Makes a Person a Parent?
In statutorily defining parenthood through surrogacy, legislatures must keep ―the question whether a child was born into a marriage‖ separate from ―whether that child has two parents.‖164 After all, marriage historically constituted a proxy for
presumed biology. In the context of same-sex parents who plan
to conceive a child together through surrogacy, however, marriage cannot serve as a proxy for biology due to innate structural infertility. Marriage instead would seem ―a proxy for consent of the definite legal parent—the biological [intended
parent]—to share parental rights‖ with the non-biological intended parent.165
If the actual underlying consideration is consent to parent,
legislatures should draft statutory language that does not utilize marriage as the mechanism to confer parenthood to a nonbiological intended parent.166 Instead, surrogacy statutes
should attach parental rights to a non-biological parent based
exclusively on measures that capture her or his consent to parent the future child.
2. What Triggers Severing a Surrogate‘s Parental Status?
Surrogacy proves problematic due to an additional third
party fulfilling an indispensable biological role in the reproduction process. In other words, ―a third party is always present to
assert a competing claim of parentage.‖167 Thus, a statute that
confers parental status to a non-biological intended parent
must simultaneously address what rights and responsibilities—if any—will vest in a surrogate who carries the child to
term. Due to constitutional concerns, however, legislatures may
not treat traditional and gestational surrogacy as existing in
parity.168
a. Statutes Addressing Traditional Surrogacy
When a same-sex couple procreates through traditional
164. Joanna L. Grossman, The New Illegitimacy: Tying Parentage to Marital Status for Lesbian Co-Parents, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL‘Y & L. 671,
720 (2012); see also Which Ties Bind?, supra note 1, at 1047 (noting that marriage should not continue as the primary vehicle for establishing parent-child
relationships).
165. Grossman, supra note 164, at 718.
166. Cf. Polikoff, supra note 91, at 212 (―[O]nce marriage does not determine parental rights and responsibilities, the law must decide what does.‖).
167. Dana, supra note 4, at 378.
168. See supra note 94 for further definition around this distinction.
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surrogacy, a statute cannot automatically strip a surrogate‘s
parentage rights and vest them in a non-biological intended
parent. Traditional surrogates utilize their own ova in the reproduction process, creating a biological link between the surrogate and the future child. And the Constitution recognizes a
fundamental interest in the companionship of one‘s natural
child.169 While entering the agreement knowing she bears the
child on behalf of its intended parents, a surrogate very well
may deem herself unable to part with her child at the time of
birth.170 Accordingly, a statutory provision divesting a biological mother of legal parentage of a child at its birth may be
deemed unconstitutional.171 A non-biological intended parent‘s
legal status instead must be conferred through an adoption only after a traditional surrogate‘s rights are severed.172
b. Statutes Addressing Gestational Surrogacy
In contrast, a statute addressing gestational surrogacy can
strip a surrogate‘s parentage rights and vest them in a nonbiological intended parent from the moment of birth or before.173 Unlike traditional surrogates, gestational surrogates do
not utilize their own ova in the production process. The fundamental interest in the companionship of a natural child, recognized in traditional surrogacy, arguably diminishes in gesta-

169. See U.S. CONST. amends. I, IX, XIV, § 1; see also Wilke v. Culp, 483
A.2d 420, 425 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1984) (―It has . . . been held that a
parent‘s right to the care and companionship of his or her child are so fundamental as to be guaranteed protection under the . . . Constitution.‖). This right
is not absolute, however. The State may infringe upon a legal parent‘s right to
custody and control over a child if the parent endangers the health or safety of
the child. See V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 548 (N.J. 2000). But absent a showing of unfitness, abandonment, or gross misconduct, there is no reason to interfere with a parent‘s constitutional prerogatives. Id. at 549.
170. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1236 (N.J. 1988).
171. Only Virginia‘s surrogacy statute allows traditional surrogates to sever parental rights through a contract pre-authorized by the court, while reserving for the surrogate a 180-day contract termination period. See VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 20-156 to -165. Because this statute has not been used or tested in
court, its constitutionality is unresolved. Absent a contrary statute, however,
states will view the traditional surrogate as the legal parent, and little sentiment exists for changing this result. See Interview with June Carbone, supra
note 16; cf. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1242.
172. See Dana, supra note 4, at 365 (analogizing a traditional surrogacy
agreement to an adoption). In pursuit of uniformity, however, legislatures can
promulgate one statute for traditional and gestational surrogacy, both held to
the higher constitutional threshold potentially required for the former.
173. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801 (UNIF. LAW COMM‘N 2002).
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tional surrogacy.174 With no genetic link existing between the
gestational carrier and the future child, the surrogate ―is ‗not
exercising her own right to make procreative choices; she is
agreeing to provide a necessary and profoundly important service‘ to parents who ‗intended to procreate a child genetically
related to them by the only available means.‘‖175 Thus, a legislature can constitutionally promulgate statutes wherein legal
parent status never bestows in a gestational surrogate.
3. How To Create a Portable Set of Parentage Rights
Intended same-sex parents cannot rely exclusively on the
marital presumption to confer legal parenthood through surrogacy.176 Legislatures must instead enact statutory provisions
that clarify legal parentage during early stages of a surrogacy
agreement, so as to effectively create more concrete rights and
responsibilities in non-biological intended parents—regardless
of marital status upon a child‘s birth. Furthermore, the legal
recognition bestowed through surrogacy must simultaneously
be enforceable across jurisdictions. Such outcomes are achievable by way of birth certificate recognition.
Birth certificates constitute the official legal record evidencing a child‘s parentage.177 For a child born through surrogacy, the biological intended parent would appear on the birth
certificate. However, competing claims for the birth certificate‘s
remaining blank space exist between the non-biological intended parent and the surrogate. In the event of traditional surrogacy, the birth mother does not intend to serve as a child‘s legal
parent; and in the event of gestational surrogacy, not only does
the gestational carrier not intend to serve as a child‘s legal parent, but no genetic link exists between the surrogate and the
174. Some may disagree with this assertion, arguing that gestation would
confer parental rights on the basis of nature by definition. This Note, however,
advocates for a diminished parental right absent a genetic link. ―The argument that a woman cannot knowingly and intelligently agree to gestate and
deliver a baby for intending parents carries overtones of the reasoning that for
centuries prevented women from attaining equal economic rights.‖ See Dana,
supra note 4, at 368.
175. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 787 (Cal. 1993)).
176. See supra Part II.A.
177. Birth certificates do not establish legal parentage, but instead dictate
parentage in the state of issue. Because parents‘ names are entered onto a
birth certificate by virtue of marriage, states that did not recognize same-sex
marriage before Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), were not required to recognize the birth certificate either. See Polikoff, supra note 91, at
238–39.
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future child. Because gestational carriers often regard intended
parents as parents,178 the stronger claim arguably rests with
the non-biological parent who intended to parent the child from
the moment of conception.179 But the underlying problem remains that ―parentage statutes that remain gender-specific,
with one individual identified as mother and the other identified as father, simply do not contemplate or accommodate parentage by same-sex couples.‖180
Reform thus requires reconceptualizing birth certificates
as reflecting a child‘s intended parentage instead of biological
parentage.181 Placing a non-biological intended parent on the
birth certificate will minimize the opportunity and success of
disestablishing parentage of a child conceived and birthed
through surrogacy.182
B. PROPOSED MODEL SURROGACY STATUTES
Acknowledging that not all states will permit gestational
surrogacy,183 whereas others will not permit traditional surrogacy,184 this Note proposes two distinct solutions—one intended
expressly for gestational surrogacy arrangements, and another
that states can tailor for purposes of either traditional or gesta178. See What Motivates Gestational Carriers?, RESOLVE: NAT‘L INFERTILIASS‘N (2015), http://www.resolve.org/family-building-options/surrogacy/
what-motivates-gestational-carriers.html. See generally Todd D. Pizitz et al.,
Do Women Who Choose To Become Surrogate Mothers Have Different Psychological Profiles Compared to a Normative Female Sample?, 26 WOMEN BIRTH
15 (2013) (noting that surrogate mothers are both resilient and aware of the
importance of emotional boundary setting during the surrogacy process).
179. See generally D.C. CODE §§ 7-205(e)(3), 16-909(e) (2015); Civil Code of
Québec, S.Q. 1991, c 64, art 538–39 (Can.); cf. Polikoff, supra note 91, at 239.
180. Black, supra note 134, at 808.
181. This will require cooperation of state divisions of vital records to modify birth certificates to list parents as ―parents‖ rather than ―mother‖ and ―father.‖ See id. at 841.
182. A birth certificate, while ―not definitive proof‖ of parentage, ―is the one
piece of commonly accepted evidence.‖ Polikoff, supra note 91, at 238–39.
Thus, intended parents can simultaneously obtain a parentage judgment to
bolster the birth certificate‘s strength and to ensure recognition of a nonbiological intended parent‘s rights. NAT‘L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, LEGAL
RECOGNITION OF LGBT FAMILIES (2015), http://www.nclrights.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/07/Legal_Recognition_of_LGBT_Families.pdf; cf. Parness &
Townsend, supra note 83, at 607 (noting that such acknowledgments make
disestablishment more difficult).
183. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (2011); D.C. CODE §§ 16-401, -402
(2009); IND. CODE § 31-20-1-1 (2010).
184. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-1805, 08 (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801 (2008).
TY
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tional surrogacy. Thus, to effectuate the aforementioned considerations underlying statutory reform despite inevitable
state-by-state variation, this Section proposes two model statutes upon which states can frame surrogacy laws: one that
transfers parental rights to intended parents pre-conception;
and an alternative that transfers rights to intended parents
post-birth.
1. Pre-Conception Birth Order Statute
To ensure that a non-biological intended parent cannot
disestablish parentage while the child remains in utero, this
statutory framework suggests requiring a pre-conception parentage order for gestational surrogacy arrangements. A preconception order would confer legal parent status to the two intended parents and would occur before a medical professional
implants a viable embryo in the surrogate for gestation.185
Thus, from the point the surrogate begins her active role in the
reproduction process, the future child will not be viewed as the
child of the gestational carrier, but instead the intended parents.186 And, upon the child‘s birth, the intended parents identified on the pre-conception order will be placed on the birth certificate.187 In the context of same-sex intended parents, this
signifies that both the biological parent and non-biological parent will be recognized at the child‘s birth notwithstanding marital status or biology.

PROPOSED STATUTE
Subdivision 1. Pre-Conception Parentage Order.
185. Cf. Polikoff, supra note 91, at 249–50 (―[B]oth . . . know from the moment of pregnancy that [one] partner is not the child‘s biological parent. The
decisions the two [intended parents] make at that point have consequences for
the child and should have legal consequences.‖).
186. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801 (UNIF. LAW COMM‘N 2002). ―Because
the mother‘s gestational labor has not yet begun, she does not have a greater
claim to the status of parent and the attendant decisionmaking [sic] abilities.‖
Purvis, supra note 92, at 668.
187. ―[T]he law must recognize as parent any individual (regardless of gender, sexual orientation, or marital status) who is biologically related to a
child.‖ Black, supra note 134, at 812–13. Thus, such a statute cannot apply to
traditional surrogacy. Instead, a non-biological intended parent can only be
recognized through a second-parent adoption proceeding upon the surrogate‘s
voluntary waiver of parentage.
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a)

Any person who intends to parent a child born through
gestational surrogacy must sign a pre-conception parentage
order (order) prior to a surrogate‘s gestation of a fertilized
ovum or ova.
1) At least one person, and no more than two persons, shall
be identified on the order as intending to parent the future child.
A) If one person is identified on the order, that person
shall be recognized as the future child‘s parent.
B) If two persons are identified on the order, those persons shall be recognized as the future child‘s parents.
2) The gestational surrogate shall sign the order, indicating her understanding that she will not be recognized as
the future child‘s parent.
b) The order shall be enforceable, notwithstanding:
1) marital status of the person(s) identified on the order;
2) genetic relation between the person(s) identified on the
order and the future child;
3) sex of the person(s) identified on the order.
Subdivision 2. Recognition of Parents at Birth.
a) After the child‘s birth, the person(s) identified on the order
shall appear on the child‘s birth certificate, notwithstanding:
1) marital status of the person(s) identified on the order;
2) genetic relation between the person(s) identified on the
order and the child;
3) sex of the person(s) identified on the order.
b) The gestational surrogate shall not appear on the child‘s
birth certificate.
2. Intent/Labor-Based Parentage Statute
A legislature may be uncomfortable with divesting a gestational surrogate of any parentage rights to a future child prior
to the commencement of her gestational role.188 Thus, statutory
provisions can analogize surrogacy to a quasi-adoption arrangement, recognizing a surrogate—either traditional or gestational—as the legal mother before and at the child‘s birth.
While such a framework offers surrogates an enhanced role
relative to the pre-conception parentage order statute, intentbased and labor-based considerations can protect the intended
188. See supra Part II.B.
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parents‘ indispensable role in the reproduction process. And
further, safeguards can be codified to ensure that a nonintended biological parent cannot move to disestablish
parenthood while the child is in utero, despite the surrogate‘s
recognition as the legal mother.
PROPOSED STATUTE
Subdivision 1. Pre-Birth Parentage Order.
a) Any person who intends to parent a child born through
traditional or gestational surrogacy must sign a pre-birth
parentage order (order) after a surrogate‘s post-conception
gestation of a fertilized ovum or ova begins, but prior to the
child‘s birth.
1) At least one person, and no more than two persons, shall
be identified on the order as intending to parent the future child.
A) If one person is identified on the order, that person
shall be recognized as the future child‘s parent.
B) If two persons are identified on the order, those persons shall be recognized as the future child‘s parents.
2) The surrogate shall be recognized as the future child‘s
legal mother during gestation.
b) The order shall be enforceable, notwithstanding:
1) marital status of the person(s) identified on the order;
2) genetic relation between the person(s) identified on the
order and the future child;
3) sex of the person(s) identified on the order.
Subdivision 2. Recognition of Parents at Birth.
a) After the child‘s birth, the surrogate—traditional or gestational—and any person identified on the order who shares
genetic relation with the child shall be recognized as the
child‘s parents.
b) Traditional Surrogacy. The surrogate shall have up to 72
hours after the child‘s birth to seek recognition as the
child‘s legal parent.189
189. Such a time frame may appear unduly unequivocal. The time frame
provision, however, draws heavily from current adoption statutes. For example, forty-seven states and the District of Columbia statutorily specify ―when a
birth parent may execute consent to adoption.‖ CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, CONSENT TO ADOPTION 4 (2013), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/
consent.pdf. Thirty-one states require a post-birth waiting period, ―[t]he most
common waiting period . . . [being] 72 hours.‖ Id.

DEPRINCE_6fmt

834

1/3/2016 1:01 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[100:797

1) The surrogate will automatically receive recognition as a
legal parent.
2) If the surrogate fails to act within 72 hours after the
child‘s birth, the person(s) identified on the order shall
appear on the child‘s birth certificate, notwithstanding:
A) marital status of the person(s) identified on the order;
B) genetic relation between the person(s) identified on
the order and the child;
C) sex of the person(s) identified on the order.
c) Gestational Surrogacy. The surrogate shall have up to 72
hours after the child‘s birth to seek recognition as the
child‘s legal parent.
1) A gestational surrogate will not automatically receive
recognition as a legal parent. The court shall weigh the
surrogate‘s parentage claim against that of the person(s) identified on the order.
A) Any person(s) identified on the order shall receive
recognition by way of:
(i) intent to parent;
(ii) time, money, and labor invested in executing the
surrogacy agreement;
(iii) the child‘s best interests;
(iv) other equitable factors.
B) A gestational surrogate will only be recognized if the
court deems such recognition in the child‘s best interests.
2) If the surrogate fails to act within 72 hours after the
child‘s birth, the person(s) identified on the order shall
appear on the child‘s birth certificate, notwithstanding:
A) marital status of the person(s) identified on the order;
B) genetic relation between the person(s) identified on
the order and the child;
C) sex of the person(s) identified on the order.
C. WEIGHING THE OPTIONS
Each of the above statutes has respective strengths and
weaknesses, with both resulting in positive and negative consequences around surrogacy arrangements. After weighing and
critiquing both models, each state will need to decide which op-

DEPRINCE_6fmt

2015]

1/3/2016 1:01 PM

RECONCEPTUALIZING PARENTHOOD

835

tion best matches the needs, and socioeconomic and political
composition, of its constituency.
At least in the realm of gestational surrogacy, the preconception birth order statute displays the opportunity for the
clearest and most consistent outcomes: the future child will not
be viewed as the child of the gestational carrier, but instead of
the intended parents. Due to constitutional concerns,190 such
certainty cannot attach to traditional surrogacy arrangements;
as a result, same-sex parents, choosing to procreate through
this avenue, must rely on comparatively more-uncertain prebirth parentage orders or traditional adoptions. Statutorily codifying such a disparity, however, can be justified as simply following trends in surrogacy arrangements. Indeed, ―ninety-five
percent of surrogacy arrangements in the United States are
gestational.‖191 As a result, implementing statutes requiring a
pre-conception parentage order would create certainty in legal
parenthood for almost all surrogacy arrangements.
Though such certainty appears attractive, the corollary is
that such statutes may incentivize individuals to pursue gestational surrogacy when they would otherwise prefer traditional
surrogacy arrangements—the ultimate effect being the herding
of collective procreative decision-making in the LGBT community. Furthermore, preference aside, such incentivization toward gestational surrogacy may price future parents out of the
option. From conception to birth, the average gestational surrogacy costs approximately $100,000, after taking legal fees, medical procedure expenses, and surrogate compensation into account.192 Individuals desiring the statutory certainties of
gestational surrogacy may be unable to afford this avenue, forcing them either to pursue a traditional surrogacy arrangement
or to leave the surrogacy market altogether.
Surrogacy also poses quandaries amongst select demographics throughout the United States, with opponents severely opposed to its practice on ethical grounds.193 Based on
190.
191.
192.
193.

See supra Part III.A.2.a.
Dana, supra note 4, at 363.
See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
See generally Rosalie Ber, Ethical Issues in Gestational Surrogacy, 21
THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 153 (2000) (arguing that gestational surrogacy is a form of prostitution and slavery as well as an exploitation of the
poor); Jennifer Lahl & Christopher White, Why Gestational Surrogacy Is
Wrong, NAT‘L REV. ONLINE (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.nationalreview.com/
article/375364/why-gestational-surrogacy-wrong-jennifer-lahl-christopher
-white (arguing that there are medical and moral consequences of paying
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the demographic composition of a given state, legislatures may
feel inherent discomfort with advocating for pre-conception
parentage orders. Wholly divesting gestational surrogates of
any parentage rights before her gestational role begins would
certainly meet political backlash in states where surrogacy is
already ethically suspect. In response, pre-birth parentage orders effectively make surrogacy appear more akin to a quasiadoption process, which can have the effect of increased institutional support for—or alternatively, reduced inherent discomfort with—surrogacy. While this provides less certainty than
the pre-conception corollary, it can achieve overall enhanced legal certainty in defining parenthood, as compared to surrogacy
arrangements pursued absent statutory safeguards.
Unlike the pre-conception parentage order statute, this approach does not implicate constitutional concerns around traditional surrogacy, as it does not entail divesting parentage
rights in a surrogate pre-birth. This results in a policy tradeoff.
Though pre-birth parentage orders offer less certainty than
pre-conception parentage orders, it permits a more equal level
of protection between traditional and gestational surrogacy
agreements. As a result, couples that prefer traditional surrogacy for personal and economic reasons are afforded more uniform parentage safeguards, instead of being herded toward gestational surrogacy or forced to exit the surrogacy market.
It will be for each state to decide ultimately which model
framework will best fit its needs and the needs of its constituency. In so electing, states must keep in mind the fundamental
problem underlying reform: existing frameworks do not currently guarantee that children born to same-sex parents will
maintain legal ties to both intended parents upon dissolution of
the relationship. To the extent that there remains a generalized
preference for children having two parents, either of these
statutes will help to effectuate and realize that goal.
CONCLUSION
Parenthood was once easily determined: when a married
couple conceived of a child through sexual reproduction, the
mother and her husband were legally bound as parents. The
deviation from the historic unification of sex, reproduction, and
marriage during the late-twentieth century, however, introduced inherent uncertainty of what it means to be a parent.
women to gestate babies and that women and children are exposed to exploitation).
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This collapse of the prototypical traditional family unit necessitated revisualization of centuries-old common law. Today, social perceptions around parenthood are now challenged once
more by way of same-sex couples not only receiving legal marital recognition, but also the capacity to reproduce biologically
through assisted reproductive means. Yet, intended same-sex
parents cannot rely exclusively on the current frameworks to
confer legal parenthood through surrogacy.
With family law arriving at a new crossroads, a new basis
to define legal parentage when same-sex couples procreate
through surrogacy is necessary. Such redefinition requires not
just social reconceptualization, but legislative action toward
statutory clarification. This Note posits two model frameworks
for states to adopt and tailor: one requiring a pre-conception
parentage order, and the other requiring a pre-birth parentage
order. These statutory frameworks will not only create a portable set of cross-jurisdictional parentage rights, but will also better define what makes a person a parent as well as what triggers severing a surrogate‘s parental status. To the extent that a
generalized preference exists for children being raised with the
support of two parents, such statutory proposals will help
achieve a child‘s best interests regardless of the sex or marital
status of her or his parents when she or he is born.

